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Ever since the recognition of ongoing, human-induced, large-scale environmental degradation, 
from the early 1960s onwards, the scholarly community has looked at democracy with mixed 
feelings. Some assert, quite openly, that democracy is devastating for the environmental 
performance of countries, some claim the opposite, while yet other scholars suggest that 
democratic models other than liberal democracy may offer a route forwards, towards a 
sustainable society. Both political theorists and empirical social scientists add fuel to this debate, 
and neither side has of yet settled the argument. For obvious reasons, political theorists typically 
lack empirical evidence for most of their assertions as to whether democracy per se, or different 
variants of democracy, are more or less pro-environmental. In parallel, empirically oriented 
scholarship has been impaired with poor data, often obstructing them from properly evaluating 
democracy’s actual environmental pros and cons. In this paper we make use of recently collected 
unique data, enabling us to better address both these literatures. Using the data gathered by the 
Varieties of Democracy project on different conceptions of democracy, we empirically test 
whether different features of democracy, such as liberal in its thinner understanding, social-
liberal, and deliberative, are beneficial for countries’ commitment to environmental 
improvements. In particular, we investigate which of these distinct features make democracies 
more prone to deliver environmental policy outputs, i.e., adopt climate laws, develop stricter 
environmental policies and incorporate sustainability into economic policies. 
 








Which political system is best suited to deal with problems related to the environment and, by 
extension, to contribute to global sustainable development? Even if some environmental 
problems may have been solved, mitigated or, alternatively, been exported to parts of the world 
where mainly developed countries do not experience them anymore, this question remains focal. 
Despite a rather short history of public and political attention – basically only some fifty to sixty 
years – environmental problems have already taken on many different guises, and every one of 
them is, indeed, politically challenging. In the 1960s, environmental problems primarily referred 
to rather isolated issues, such as emissions and pollution. Gradually, focus on the environment 
increasingly became a matter of global sustainable development, including an emphasis on both 
pure environmental status and economic and social development, where the principal actors and 
agents of moral interest and concern, exist both today and in a distant future.1 As we see it, the 
more complex and all-embracing environmental issues become, the more justified it is to 
simultaneously ask which political system is best armed to deal with environmental problems? 
One, currently rather popular, response is to argue that preventing and coping with an 
approaching environmental system collapse requires some kind of ‘Earth System Governance’ 
arrangement (Biermann, 2014; Burch et al., 2019) albeit without really specifying what type of 
political system this would presuppose (democracy or some other form of government), nor 
what steering mechanisms such a governance system would be constituted by. Another popular 
approach over the years is to simply conclude that since most environmental problems have 
been generated in democratic countries, democracy needs to be exchanged for some other form 
of government if we are ever to overcome environmental problems (Ehrlich, 2013; Heilbroner, 
1974; Kennedy, 1993; Ophuls, 1977). This line of argument has gained some additional fuel 
lately as investment in green technology has rapidly expanded in China, according to some 
observers,  supposedly indicating that authoritarian regimes are better equipped to deal with 
environmental challenges (see Randers, 2012).  
We see few advantages in trying to approach our research problem along any of these two 
routes. The first endeavour appears to indicate some kind of social science fiction version of 
state theory, steering us away from any ambitions to concretely contribute to the understanding 
 
1 In later years, scientists and policy makers have instead begun to talk about the Anthropocene, referring to an already 
ongoing geological era during which humanity is the principal driver of the changes we see on the globe today and 
where the environment is understood as an extremely complex ‘Earth system’, defined by planetary boundaries and 
currently dashing towards collapse at a rapidly increasing speed. 
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of prospects for successful environmental politics, while the second falls short on a number of 
premises, including the empirical fact that other than China and Singapore, authoritarian regimes 
have generally not paid active attention to environmental problems.2  
Instead, we aim to investigate the question as to which political system is best suited to deal with 
environmental issues from two other angles. First, in the field of green political theory there is a 
mature and well-elaborated debate concerning which political system is best equipped to cope 
with environmental problems.3 At least one common denominator within this by now rather 
dated literature is that democracy is not necessarily bad for the environment as such, but rather 
that the liberal-democratic model in particular is the major root for most of the environmental 
challenges that we are confronted with today. One reason for this is an assumed close 
relationship between liberal democracy and negative political rights on the one hand and 
capitalism/the market on the other, both of which can be devastating for the environmental 
cause (and, for that matter, also for any ambitions to upgrade moral concern and responsibility 
such that future generations’ interests are included into present-day decision-making). Therefore, 
alternative models have been suggested, and these are primarily i) social-liberal democracy and ii) 
deliberative democracy. A problem with this theoretically founded literature is, however, that it 
has seldom, if ever, been subject to empirical scrutiny. Thus, apart from a few examples of case 
studies investigating whether the practicing of alternative democracy models would be more 
beneficial for the environment (Bäckstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & Lövbrand, 2010; Dryzek, 2001, 
2011), it remains an open question as to whether this is actually the case or not.  
A second strand of literature is much less theoretically informed, and instead focuses on studying 
whether democratic countries are generally better equipped to generate environmental solutions 
compared to authoritarian regimes (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Li & Reuveny, 2006). The latter 
approach can, and has been, criticized for not distinguishing between different types of 
 
2 According to Paehlke (1995, p. 140) the authoritarian solution can be criticised from at least the following three 
angles: 1) authoritarian rulers are unlikely to be sensitive to, or informed about ecological matters; 2) authoritarian 
regimes are not necessarily good at inducing positive behaviour, especially in the long term; 3) democracy provides a 
much better climate for social and economic mobilisation. Paehlke’s notes can be elaborated somewhat further. 
First, there is no empirical support for an authoritarian regime’s success in solving environmental problems, while 
environmental improvements have been fairly significant in many democracies. Second (which is a matter that can 
be related to the issue of political decision permanency), even if an eco-authoritarian political regime was to be 
established, there are no guarantees that the eco-focus will be kept over time. What will happen the day the 
ecological king dies? See also Barry (2014, pp. 194–202) for a short but illuminating critique of the idea of an 
authoritarian political system, and Lafferty & Meadowcroft (1996, p. 3) on whether authoritarian political systems 
have been proved more eco-efficient than democratic ones. Ostrom (1990) discusses self-organizing environmental 
management as an empirical (and theoretical) response to the tragedy-paradigm. See also Radcliffe´s (2000) 
examination of Ophuls (1977) and Heilbronner (1974). 
3 In fact, it appears to be so well elaborated that the debate has almost vanished in latter years. 
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democratic models or regimes. A likely reason for this empirical gap has been the lack of 
available data.  
In this paper, we amalgamate these two approaches and empirically test if countries that are 
drawn towards ‘thin’ liberal-, social-liberal, or deliberative democracy are more successful in 
developing environmental commitments compared to countries drawn towards other types of 
democratic regimes. We are thus not trying to attribute a country to a certain political system, but 
we rather try to categorize countries as having more or less of these three features in their 
respective political constructs.  
Our measures of different features of democracy are founded on data from the Varieties of 
Democracy Project and the Index of Economic Freedom from the Fraser Institute (2020), while 
data on environmental commitments is from Eskander and Frankhauser (2020), OECD statistics 
(Botta & Koźluk, 2014), and the expert survey for the Transformation Index from Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (Donner, Hartmann, & Schwarz, 2020). 
Our analysis contributes to an ‘evaluation’ of the more than fifty-year-old academic debate 
concerned with determining which political system is best suited to cope with environmental 
problems. Our analysis also provides grounds for further theorizing on how future societies can 
successfully deal with the grand challenges associated with sustainable development and, even 
more so, with how to govern the Earth’s ecosystems. In our view, to avoid drifting towards 
‘social science fiction’, it is better to recognize and proceed from prevailing political systems and 
to discuss how they can be designed differently. To quote Eckersley (2004, p. 5): ‘…like it or not, 
those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to 
“rebuild the ship while still at sea” ’.  
In the next section, we first account further for the debate on the relationship between different 
democratic models and the environment. Further, we describe our empirical strategy, including 
operationalisation of our concepts, and present the regression equations underlying our statistical 
analyses. Thereafter, we present our results, followed by a discussion and a concluding section in 
which we critically examine our endeavours and discuss how this strand of research can be 
further advanced.            
Theory and previous research 
The ultimate goal of most current environmental policies is sustainable development, a global 
political project to fulfill human needs without jeopardising the ability of future generations to 
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fulfill their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). For this 
to be realized, according to one of the instigators, The Brundtland Commission, ‘painful choices 
have to be made’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 9). It is easy 
to agree with this. Reaching sustainable development goals is an arduous task for any political 
system. The question is simply – is it equally difficult for all political systems, or are some better 
equipped to secure strong environmental commitments than others?  
The flouted (thin) liberal democracy 
Over the years, many social theorists have argued that implementation of pro-environmental 
policies would be particularly difficult for/in liberal democracies, typically claiming that there are 
certain ‘inherent weaknesses’ of liberal democracy (De Geus, 2001, p. 20 ff) and thus that the 
whole foundation of liberal democracy is incompatible with environmental concerns (cf. 
Dobson, 2007, p. 164 ff).  
Some assert that to claim a strong concern for environmental issues would violate the whole 
foundation of liberal democracy, that is autonomy and individual self-rule (Mathews, 1995, p. 69). 
This emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy works against the emergence of ecological 
identity and consciousness (1995, p. 94). Another critique concerns limits to the problem-solving 
capacity of liberal democracy. For example, the distribution of power in liberal democratic systems is 
inevitably skewed, and business always has a ‘privileged’ position due to the financial resources 
available to it (Dryzek, 1992, p. 22 ff). Liberal democracies also identify and disaggregate 
environmental problems based on the particular interests of affected parties. The time horizon in a 
liberal democracy is often no longer than that of the market.4 Furthermore, liberal democracy is 
addicted to economic growth because if growth ceases, then distributional inequalities become more 
apparent. This fear of economic downturn means that liberal democracies are ‘imprisoned by the 
market’s growth imperative’ (cf. Hayward, 1998, p. 162).  
As we can see, many of the theorists opposing liberal democracy’s environmental credentials 
describe it as a very restricted form of democracy. It represents a compromise between liberalism’s 
primary concern with individualistically conceived political and property rights on the one hand, and 
a vision of democratic representation, participation and accountability on the other (Barns, 1995, p. 
 
4 Eckersley (1995) agrees with Dryzek on liberal democracy’s narrow time frames. ‘Liberal democracies generally 
operate on the basis of very short time horizons (corresponding, at the most, with election periods)’. Furthermore, she 
claims that existing ‘liberal democratic bargaining processes also deal very poorly with uncertainties and complexities of 
ecological problems’ (Eckersley, 1995, p. 170).  
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120). Such interpretations of ‘liberal’ prevent the state from interfering into individual liberties 
and regulating behaviour towards environmentally friendly standards. 
We would like to note that the theories and theorists criticizing liberal democracies rarely, if ever, 
discuss liberal features pertaining to the rule of law and constraints on the executive that are 
beneficial for securing environmental commitments on the political agenda (cf. Povitkina & 
Bolkvadze, 2019). Instead, they focus on a very thin understanding of liberal democracy and 
hypothesize that liberal democracy, as founded on this thin understanding of liberalism, should 
be a very poor political system when it comes to overcoming large-scale environmental 
challenges, be they generated in the past or still to come. 
Social-liberal democracy 
A response to the rather aggressive critique of thin liberal democracy is built on a thicker 
understanding of liberal democracy, that is, social- or developmental liberal democracy (Held, 
1997), initially pronounced by (non-environmentally oriented) political theorists such as Rawls 
(1972), Dworkin (1981), Raz (1989), Sen (1988, 1992) and Rothstein (1999). There are at least 
three lines of argumentations that can substantiate such a claim (cf. Achterberg, 1993; Jagers, 
2007).  
First, a thicker, social-liberal understanding of liberal (democracy) allows for the inclusion of 
both negative and positive liberties and rights. In this way, it (at least theoretically) opens up the 
possibility that a healthy environment can be regarded as a positive and substantial right. Such a 
right is hardly plausible in a thin understanding of liberal democracy, as that would immediately 
be seen as a violation of more fundamental negative liberties and rights, such as the right to hold 
private property. Thus, it is conceivable that social-liberal democracies are more likely to protect 
the environment than thinner and more protective liberal democracies. The stronger the legal 
status such a positive environmental right has in a country, the more vigorously the government 
can act to the benefit of the environment, since what is at stake is actually the guarantee of 
citizens’ equal rights to a healthy environment (cf. Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2003). 
Second, the environment is commonly associated with development (cf. Sustainable 
Development). This often implies that unless countries and their citizens are enjoying a certain 
level of general social and economic wealth, there is a pronounced risk that the environment will 
be damaged due to factors such as lack of investment in efficient production and consumption 
and the risk that retained poverty will drive environmental degradation. If this is correct, then it 
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is likely that the more developed, socially and economically, and social-liberal a country is, the 
better it will perform well in regard to the environment.  
Third, there are also a number of, somewhat more political-philosophical, reasons to assume that 
governments in countries in which the ideological and political-cultural orientation is guided by 
more social-liberal principles could be expected to have more ‘space’ to act to the benefit of the 
environment. Most notable is the possibility to extend several classic principles asserted by a 
number of renowned (more or less) social-liberal theorists (cf. Jagers 2007), such as Mill’s (1884) 
no-harm principle, Raz’s (1989) generous understanding of state-neutrality, Sen’s (1992) equality of 
capabilities, Dworkin’s (1981) principle of equal concern and respect and Gewirth’s (1978) autonomy 
principle.  
While there are several arguments that can be used to substantiate the claim that social-liberal 
democracy should be more successful in generating pro-environmental politics, including the 
above-mentioned principles and the fact that a healthy environment can be considered a human 
right, it is important to emphasize that any such environmental inclusion and extension is in such 
a case achieved at the price of a more or less comprehensive reduction in the protection of other 
liberties and rights, especially the right to hold property. Thus, a green social-liberal democracy is 
most likely to be encumbered with higher income and wealth taxes but also be more ambitious 
in ‘pushing’ environmental policy instruments, such as various environmental taxes.   
Deliberative democracy 
Rather than thin understandings of liberal democracy, green democratic theorists have also 
commonly suggested varying forms of de-centralised democracy, sometimes called ‘strong’ 
democracy (Eckersley, 1995, p. 171). The most popular variant of strong democracy discussed 
among greens is ‘deliberative’ democracy (Barry, 2014; De-Shalit, 2000; Dryzek, 1987, 1990; 
Eckersley, 1997; Hayward, 1998; Jacobs, 1996). Such democracy refers to a form of collective 
decision-making that stresses the community over the market or the state as the location for 
first-order decisions concerning social-environmental relations.  
This means that such a democracy makes the state and the market the instruments of the 
democratic decisions of the community. That is, the deliberative ‘speech situation’ reduces 
former power relations in such a way that each and every interest now speaks and argues on an 
equal footing, that is the best argument wins, no matter whose argument it is. Some even claim 
that in situations in which the good arguments outdo the bad ones, individuals’ opinions can be 
changed in such a way that different opinions are not only modified, but also rectified, i.e., a 
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former controversy ends up in ‘consensus’ (cf. Hayward 1998; Habermas 1996, p.100; Cohen 
1997:75).  As deliberative democratic institutions offer opportunities for broader public 
participation for a diverse set of actors, as well as setting a platform for deeper and more 
enlighted public debate, deliberative democracy is argued to benefit environmental commitments 
significantly more than the thin liberal variant (Smith, 2003).  
In Table 1, we summarize the main features of the different ideal types of democracy, starting 
with the baseline democracy model, which is simply the thinnest possible procedural democracy, 
here termed electoral democracy.  
Table 1. Four conceptions of democracy  
Political system Main features 
Baseline: Electoral Democracy Thin procedural democracy (Dahl, 1971): 
elected officials 
free and fair elections  
universal suffrage 
freedom of expression/media 
freedom of association 
‘Thin’ liberal democracy Thin procedural democracy; strong individual liberties 
and strong markets 
Social-liberal democracy Thin procedural democracy; levelled out inequalities, 
including economic inequalities and social inequalities 
Deliberative democracy Thin procedural democracy; influence from social 
movements and citizens through public deliberation 
 
Empirical research on democracy and environmental performance 
Previous empirical research investigating whether or not democracy is beneficial for the 
environment has shown mixed results. The existing literature predominantly assesses the 
performance of democratic regimes comparative to authoritarian states in different types of 
environmental outcomes, such as the level of air emissions (CO2, SO2, NOx, etc.), water 
pollution (BOD, COD, lead, nitrates, etc.), deforestation, soil erosion, protection of natural 
resources, health of marine ecosystems, as well as commitment to international environmental 
agreements (Arvin & Lew, 2011; Barrett & Graddy, 2000; Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer & 
Koubi, 2009; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007; Li & Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002; Povitkina, 
2018; Sjöstedt & Jagers, 2014; Spilker, 2013). Most scholars find that higher democracy, as a 
general rule, is associated with stronger environmental performance. However, comparing the 
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results between such studies and the different indicators of environmental performance reveals 
some inconsistency. One of the key shortcomings of the previous empirical scholarship on the 
democracy-environment nexus is that the relationship between democracy and environmental 
outcomes appears far-fetched, simply because there are many other important factors, 
originating from outside the political sphere, influencing these outcomes. In our view, it is thus 
more relevant to study what political regimes actually do to protect the environment – that is, 
adopt legislation or employ various policy instruments – rather than trying to capture potential 
outcomes of these political actions, such as the level of emissions.  
Another important shortcoming of this scholarship is the lack of empirical accounting for the 
prescriptions elaborated by social theorists. While such theory predicts that democratic 
institutions can have different consequences for countries’ environmental performance, primarily 
depending on the ideological and other political-ethical ideals (i.e., ideals influenced by thin 
liberal-, social-liberal- and deliberative theory)  dominating in the different democracies, to our 
knowledge there have been no empirical studies that actually distinguish between the effects of 
such different ideological and other political-ethical ideals on the environment. In this paper, we 
aim to fill both these gaps by investigating how countries that are empirically leaning towards 
different ideal types of democracy actually perform in terms of their environmental 
commitments. Our study is explorative and, therefore, we do not derive any hypotheses from the 
theoretical literature, but we rather remain open to the patterns we discover during the empirical 
investigation.  
Econometrics and operationalization 
Data 
Environmental commitments 
We measure the extent of countries’ commitment to combat environmental problems through 
several indicators. First, we replicate the findings by Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), in which 
the authors estimate reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from national climate change 
mitigation legislation.  We subsequently add our democracy indicators into their models as 
moderators, with the intention of examining which democracies, with which dominating 
features, have succeeded in reducing CO2 emissions after introducing climate change legislation. 
The dependent variable is CO2 emission intensity measured in mega tons of CO2 per unit of 
economic output (2011 PPP $1 GDP), log-transformed. The data on climate laws and policies in 
Eskander and Fankhauser (2020) comes from the Climate Change Laws of the World dataset 
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from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment in the London 
School of Economics (2020). The dataset contains information on all climate-related documents 
adopted by countries’ governments up until 2020. The published article analyses the laws up to 
2016 and uses a variable measuring ‘stock of recent climate change mitigation laws’, a rolling sum 
of adopted laws over 3 year-periods.  
Second, we use an indicator from the OECD database on the stringency of environmental 
policies. The index is a composite measure that aggregates market-based and non-market-based 
policy instruments. These policy instruments include environmental taxes on SOx, NOx, diesel, 
and CO2; trading schemes in CO2; renewable energy and energy efficiency certificates; feed-in 
tariffs on solar and wind energy; deposit and refund schemes; emission limit values on NOx, SOx, 
PMx and sulphur content limits in diesel, as well as government expenditure on research and 
development within renewable energy (Botta & Koźluk, 2014). Higher scores on the index 
correspond to higher environmental policy stringency. The indicator is available for 34 countries 
in the OECD and BRIICS5 between 1990-2015, with gaps, but for most countries the coverage 
only extends until 2012.  
Third, to explore the variation in the non-OECD countries, we take an ‘Environmental Policy’ 
indicator from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (Donner et al., 2020). The 
indicator is an expert evaluation of the extent to which ‘environmental concerns [are] effectively 
taken into account’ in macro- and microeconomic terms, per country per year. The indicator 
ranges from 1, ‘Environmental concerns receive no consideration and are entirely subordinated 
to growth efforts. There is no environmental regulation’, to 10, ‘Environmental concerns are 
effectively taken into account and are carefully balanced with growth efforts. Environmental 
regulation and incentives are in place and enforced’.  For example, 4 on the scale means 
‘Environmental concerns receive only sporadic consideration and are often subordinated to 
growth efforts. Environmental regulation is weak and hardly enforced’ and 7 means 
‘Environmental concerns are taken into account but are occasionally subordinated to growth 
efforts. Environmental regulation and incentives are in place, but their enforcement at times is 
deficient’. The indicator thus captures countries’ environmental commitment. For more 
information about the methodology of indicator construction see Donner et. al. (2020). The 
indicator covers 137 developing countries between 2006 and 2020, with a gap every second year.  
 
5 Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa. 
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Conceptions of democracy 
We cannot strictly categorize existing democracies into the different ‘ideal’ democracy types, as 
most countries have only developed aspects related to the democratic ideal types to a certain 
degree. For example, social-liberal democracies might also have some elements of the thin liberal 
features while at the same time enjoying, to a certain extent, the processes associated with 
deliberation. This means that it is not possible to empirically categorize countries into clear 
‘types’ – they will all possess traces of all three models. We therefore instead measure the degree 
to which the ‘thin’ liberal, social-liberal and deliberative features are developed in countries, and 
our country rankings reflect the prevalence of certain features over others. 
We measure different democratic features using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project 
(V-Dem) on different conceptions of democracy (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, 
Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, 
Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Wilson, et al., 2020) and the Fraser Institute’s Index 
of Economic Freedom (2020). While the V-Dem project suggests its own indicators of liberal, 
social-liberal (egalitarian), and deliberative features for capturing different types of democracy 
(Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, & Teorell, 2014), indicators measuring these features are highly 
correlated (>0.7, see Appendix F) and therefore hard to distinguish from one another in the 
correlational analysis. Moreover, the indicator measuring liberal features from V-Dem does not 
capture the strength of the market, which is emphasized as an important deterrent of 
environmental commitments in green political theory. For these reasons, we construct our own 
indices of democratic features. We still use the measurement model output for expert answers to 
individual survey questions from V-Dem to measure deliberative and social-liberal (egalitarian) 
features (Pemstein et al., 2020), but we only select the key questions to capture the theoretical 
arguments raised in the environmental politics literature, to minimize correlation between our 
indices.6 In order to measure thin liberal features, we only use the components of the Fraser 
Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom.  
In our baseline model, we use the Electoral Democracy Index as an indicator of a thin 
procedural democracy. The index is based on the conceptualization of democracy as polyarchy 
developed by Dahl (1971). The index includes measures of the degree to which elections are free 
and fair, whether suffrage is universal, whether citizens are free to express their opinions and 
organize in civil society organizations and political parties, and whether officials are elected 
 
6 We nevertheless perform the analysis using V-Dem indicators as a robustness check, see Appendix F. 
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through popular elections. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more 
developed electoral democracy principles.  
According to existing theories, the main critique of liberal democracy in its thin conception lies in the 
relative strength of the market and the influence of business in political decision-making, as well 
as a commitment to strong individual liberties that prevents governments from enforcing 
environmentally friendly behaviour on their citizens. We gauge the presence of these features 
using indicators from the Index of Economic Freedom from the Fraser Institute (Fraser 
Institute, 2020). We opted for using as many indicators that tap into individual and business 
freedom from government regulation as possible. The indicators we included are: the size of 
government, protection of property rights, freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts, 
tariffs on foreign trade, controls on the flow of capital, and credit market regulations. We do not 
integrate indicators related to regulatory quality, rule of law and ease of doing business as they 
tap into features of political systems other than thin liberal ones and are further away from the 
aspects discussed in green political theory that we are aiming to capture.7 For this reason, the 
survey questions included in the measurement of liberal democracy from V-Dem are less useful 
for out tests, as they measure individual freedoms and constraints on the executive. For more 
information on the indicators see Appendix A.  
To capture social-liberal features of countries, we use indicators that reflect inequalities within 
countries, including inequalities resulting in unequal access to healthcare (v2pehealth) and 
education (v2peedueq), whether policies are universalistic or means-tested (v2dlunivl), and 
whether expenditures go towards particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps). The indicators 
that we code into our social-liberal features can thus help us test if societies that strive for 
universal welfare also have higher environmental commitments.  
We measure democracies’ deliberative features using questions from the V-Dem dataset that gauge 
how wide and independent public deliberations are (v2dlengage), whether the political elites 
acknowledge and respect counterarguments when making policy revisions (v2dlcountr), whether 
policymakers consult civil society organizations (v2cscnsult) and whether the range of 
consultation is wide enough to include the entire political elite and ‘all politically relevant sectors 
 
7 The concept of liberal democracy in political science usually extends beyond strong individual liberties to include 
the degree of rule of law and constraints on the executive. The role of these important aspects of liberal democracies 
in countries’ environmental commitments is rarely discussed in green political theory. Instead, scholars mostly 
focused on the constraints described in our theory section. As our goal is to test the arguments brought up in green 
political theory, in this paper we only cover the aspects of liberal democracy relevant to these arguments. We put the 
label ‘thin liberal’ to the set of components that we investigate for convenience, so as to speak to these arguments, 
and do not aim to redefine the concept ‘liberal’ as established in the political science literature.  
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of society and business’ (v2dlconslt). The indicators of deliberative features thus capture the 
extent of deliberation and consultation with relevant actors. 
We calculate the indices of thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative features by conducting a 
series of factor analyses, extracting the factor scores using maximum likelihood estimation 
(mlmv in STATA). After factor analysis, the thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative indices 
are standardized and are therefore on the same scale, which makes it convenient for effect 
comparison. We rescale the indices to take only positive values.8  
Table 2 summarizes our strategy for the operationalization of different features of democracies. 
To ensure that we measure the features of democracy we only perform our analysis on the sample 
of democracies in our main analysis. We divide democratic and authoritarian regimes using the 
dichotomous democracy index from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020), which is an extended version 
of the democracy index from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).  
Table 2. Strategy for operationalization of different features of democracies  
Features of democracy Operationalization 
Electoral democracy (Model 1) Electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy, V-Dem)  
Thin liberal features (Model 2) Size of government; 
Protection of property rights; 
Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts; 
Tariffs on foreign trade; 
Capital controls; 
Credit market regulations 
Social-liberal features (Model 3) Equality in access to healthcare; 
Equality in access to education; 
Spending on particularistic or public goods; 
Means-tested or universalistic policy 
Deliberative features (Model 4) Extent of public deliberations; 
Officials’ respect for counterarguments; 
Extent of civil society consultation; 
Range of consultations 
 
We make sure to control for other relevant factors that impact environmental commitments in 
democracies. First, we take into account countries’ levels of economic development and include 
 
8 This is to prepare them for the calculation of indices of different democracy features  for the additional analysis we 
perform in Appendix D. 
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a value of countries’ GDP per capita from the World Bank Development Indicators (2016), 
available through the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al., 2020). Higher income is 
often associated with higher likelihood that people have developed post-materialistic values and 
demand environmental policies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Countries that have been members 
of the European Union have been pressured to adopt certain environmental policies, and 
therefore we control for the amount of time a country has been a member of the EU. To 
account for the impact of international trade and economic globalisation on the adoption of 
environmental policies, we include the measure of countries’ involvement in trade from the 
World Bank Development Indicators (2016). We additionally include the measure of political 
corruption from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, 
Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, 
Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Wilson, et al., 2020), which is detrimental to the 
strength of environmental commitments.  
In the models that we replicate from Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), we use their set of 
independent variables, which includes a squared term of GDP per capita, import share as a 
percentage of GDP, services share as a percentage of GDP, deviation from average air 
temperature, a cyclical component of GDP based on a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) decomposition, 
and a dummy for whether a country uses a federal system. For the list of sources and 
methodology, see Eskander and Fankhauser (2020).  
Model 
In this exploratory analysis, we are interested in estimating if there are substantial differences in 
environmental commitments between countries depending on the features of which ideal 
democratic type are more pronounced, but also whether developments in any of the features 
within democracies over time has any association with the change in their environmental 
commitments. We therefore, utilize time-series data whenever possible. When we replicate the 
model by Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), we estimate the following equation: 
𝑦!" = 𝛽# † 𝛽$𝑆!"% + 𝛽&𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽'𝑆!"% ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽'𝑧!" + 𝜃! + 𝑣" + 𝑒!"						 (1) 
where 𝑦!" represents the log of CO2 emission intensity in country i at year t; that is, 𝑦!" ≡
ln	( (!"
)*+!"
). 𝑆!"% ≡ ∑ 𝐿!("-.)'.0$ 	 is the stock of laws passed in the previous three years, which 
measures the short-term effect of legislation. Vector 𝑧!" is a set of control variables, described 
above. θi is country fixed effects and vt is year fixed effects, εit  is an error term. The country 
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effect controls for time-invariant factors such as different political cultures. The time fixed effect 
controls for intertemporal trends common across countries, such as knowledge and salience of 
climate change and fall in renewable energy costs. 
When examining the relationship between the different features of democracy and the 
environmental policy stringency index among OECD countries and the environmental 
sustainability efforts among developing countries, we estimate using the within-between model 
suggested by Bell and Jones (2015). The within-between model recognises the hierarchical 
structure of the data and simultaneously accounts for variation between the countries and 
developments over time within states. The model allows for the use of random effects by 
addressing the issue of correlated errors between the two levels of estimation (cross country and 
over time) through mean centring of time-varying variables and simultaneous inclusion of their 
country means. Following the Bell and Jones (2015) guidelines, we calculate deviations from the 
country means for each independent variable and use them instead of the raw values together 
with the country means. The model can be summarized in the following equation: 
𝑦!" = 𝛽# + 𝛽$(𝑥!" − 𝑥1:) + 𝛽&𝑥1";;;; + 𝛽'𝑧! + (𝑢! + 𝑒!")  (2) 
where i stands for country, and t – for year; 𝛽# is an intercept, x is a vector of independent time-
varying variables, while z is a vector of time-invariant variables; u is an error of the between 
equation, while e is an error in the within-equation.  
We estimate the equations several times. First, we conduct the analysis for the sample of 
democracies only, to explore how thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features correlate 
with environmental commitments, specifically among democratic states. Second, we conduct the 
analysis for the sample of all countries, with thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative 
democracies included as predictors and authoritarian regimes coded as 0 in these indexes of 
democracy (in Appendix D). This allows us to compare how the different democracy types 
perform in relation to authoritarian regimes. Third, we conduct the analysis for the sample of all 
countries without distinguishing between regime types to investigate whether the theorized 
features are important in predicting the performance of non-democratic regimes (in Appendix 
E). We compare the performance of different democracy types by comparing the size of their 
coefficients, as they are on the same scale, whether the coefficients are statistically significant, as 




The results of our model estimations with different dependent variables are presented in Tables 
Table Error! Reference source not found.. Table  summarizes the results from the replication 
of Eskander and Fankhauser (2020), a country-year fixed-effects estimation of the effect of the 
number of climate laws on CO2 emissions. We added an interaction term between ‘the stock of 
laws for the latest three years’ and the different features of democracy to estimate the effect of 
the number of laws on CO2 emissions, depending on the prevalent democratic feature. Model 1 
presents the results for the interaction effect between the electoral democracy index and the 
number of laws, Model 2 presents the results for the interaction effect between thin liberal 
features and the number of laws, Model 3 – the interaction effect between social-liberal features 
and the number of laws and Model 4 – the interaction effect between deliberative features and 
the number of laws.  
The results are statistically significant for the models with thin liberal and social-liberal features, 
which implies that it is relevant to explore these interaction effects further. The coefficient sizes 
are slightly larger for social-liberal features than for thin liberal features. While we can compare 
coefficient sizes between different features as they are on the same scale, we cannot compare 
coefficients between the electoral democracy index and the different democracy features, as they 
are measured on different scales. We can, however, compare R2 statistics and this shows that the 
model with the social-liberal features index has the highest score, although the difference is 
trivial. We further build marginal effects plots to compare the relationship between the number 
of laws and CO2 emissions in democracies with different features.  
The marginal effects plots, presented in Figure 1, show that the strongest effect from the 
number of climate laws on CO2 emissions, represented by a steeper slope, is among the 
democracies with more pronounced thin liberal and social-liberal features. This implies that as 
countries develop more liberal (in its thin conception) and social-liberal features they also tend to 
be more successful in translating their climate laws into the reduction of CO2 emission intensity. 
Development of the deliberative democracy features does not seem to play a role in determining 
whether the adopted climate laws mean a reduction in CO2 emissions.  
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Table 3. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
and the effectiveness of climate laws in democracies 
DV: ln(CO2/GDP) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
           
Electoral democracy -0.066    
 
 (0.109)    
 
Stock of laws*Elect.dem -0.020    
 
 (0.021)    
 
Thin liberal features  -0.040*   
 
  (0.020)   
 
Stock of laws*Thin liberal  -0.010†   
 
  (0.006)   
 
Social-liberal features   0.135†   
   (0.080)   
Stock of laws*Social-liberal   -0.006†   
   (0.003)   
Deliberative features    -0.030  
    (0.032)  
Stock of laws*Deliberative    0.005  
    (0.006)  
Stock of mitigation laws  0.010 0.033 0.016 -0.024  
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.012) (0.024) 
 
Constant -11.715*** -12.365*** -11.221** -11.934***  
 (3.292) (3.193) (3.374) (3.231) 
 
     
 
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480  
R2 0.476 0.484 0.485 0.477  
Number of countries 94 94 94 94  
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes  
OLS regression of a natural logarithm of CO2 emissions per 2011 PPP $1 GDP on the interaction effect 
between the stock of laws and different democracy features, with country and year fixed effects. The sample 
contains world democracies as classified by Bjørnskov-Rode (2020). The regressions control for the GDP HP 
filter, squared term of GDP per capita (natural log), the size of imports and services as a percentage of GDP, 
difference between the yearly average temperature and the long term (1980-2015) average temperature, and 
federalism. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All 





Figure 1. Marginal effects of the stock of recent climate change mitigation laws on CO2 
emissions conditional on the level of electoral democracy (1), extent of thin liberal 
features (2), social-liberal features (3), and deliberative features (4) in democracies, with 
95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4 presents the results for equation 2, where the dependent variable is the Environmental 
Policy Stringency Index from the OECD database. The sample covers OECD countries and the 
six BRIICS economies. Model 1 presents the relationship between the electoral democracy index 
and environmental policy stringency (EPS), Models 2-4 – the relationship between thin liberal, 
social-liberal, and deliberative features respectively, while Model 5 shows the results when all 
three indices are included in one model, testing whether one of them is a stronger predictor than 
the rest. The table is divided into two parts. The upper part contains coefficients from the 
between-analysis that show the relationship between democracies, while the lower part of the table 
contains the coefficients from the analysis of variation within democracies, based on changes over 
time. 
The results show that democracies with more pronounced liberal (in its thin conception) and 
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pronounced thin liberal and social-liberal features. The coefficient on the social-liberal index  is 
higher, implying that its effect on environmental policy stringency is stronger. When all three 
democracy features are included in one model for comparison, democracies with pronounced 
social-liberal and deliberative features have significant coefficients, however, the deliberative 
index is only significant at 10%, and the social-liberal index still has the highest effect size, 
implying that democracies with prevalent social-liberal features have higher environmental policy 
stringency than democracies with other dominating features.  
The results for the analysis of changes within countries showed that developments towards 
higher deliberation are actually associated with negative trends in environmental policy 
stringency. This implies that there might be a negative relationship between deliberation and 
environmental policy stringency. This result holds even when all three indices are included in one 
model for comparison.  
Comparison of the R2 statistics shows that the model with the social-liberal index has the highest 
R2 in the between-sample and the model with the deliberative index has the highest R2 for the 
within-sample. This implies that the model with the social-liberal index explains the highest 
proportion of variance in a dependent variable between countries and the model with the 
deliberative index – the highest proportion of variance in the dependent variable in the within-
sample. 
The coefficients for all control variables are in the expected direction. What particularly stands 
out is the strong negative association between corruption and environmental policy stringency, 
both in the within- and the between- analysis, implying that countries with higher corruption 
have lower environmental policy stringency and an increase in corruption levels is associated 
with a decrease in policy stringency.  
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Table 4. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
and environmental policy stringency in the democracies of OECD and BRIICS 
 DV: EPS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
            
Between part:       
Electoral democracy  0.514     
 (1.355)     
Thin liberal features  0.228†   0.219 
  (0.136)   (0.143) 
Social-liberal features   0.377***  0.305*** 
   (0.102)  (0.086) 
Deliberative features    0.253 0.288† 
    (0.201) (0.175) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade openness 1.137 0.691 -0.020 1.095 -0.189 
 (2.539) (2.449) (2.279) (1.970) (1.853) 
Time in the EU 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -1.914** -1.768*** -1.226*** -1.570*** -0.721* 
 (0.725) (0.319) (0.318) (0.351) (0.309) 
      
Within part:      
Electoral democracy  1.028     
 (1.144)     
Thin liberal features  0.008   0.028 
  (0.187)   (0.154) 
Social-liberal features   0.309  0.396 
   (0.322)  (0.301) 
Deliberative features    -0.584* -0.609* 
    (0.290) (0.298) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.029† 0.027† 0.026 0.021 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Trade openness 0.636 0.267 0.637 -1.314 -1.294 
 (5.545) (5.743) (5.649) (5.124) (5.241) 
Time in the EU 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Corruption -1.451 -1.811 -1.558 -3.705** -3.390** 
 (1.301) (1.124) (1.056) (1.176) (1.224) 
Constant 0.702 0.370 -0.368 0.111 -1.948† 
 (1.290) (0.391) (0.418) (0.733) (1.029) 
      
Observations 671 671 671 671 671 
R2 between 0.613 0.626 0.702 0.624 0.708 
R2 within 0.808 0.807 0.808 0.819 0.821 
Number of countries 31 31 31 31 31 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of environmental policy stringency on different democracy features with year fixed 
effects in the OECD and BRIICS. The sample is limited to democracies as classified by Bjørnskov-Rode (2020). 
Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for the GDP per capita (natural log), trade 
openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 





Table 5 presents the results for the relationship between the different democracy features and a 
measure of ‘environmental efforts’ in the developing countries from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index. Similar to the previous tables, Model 1 presents the results for the 
estimation of the relationship between the electoral democracy index and the measure of 
environmental efforts, Models 2-4 – for the thin-liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative 
democracy features respectively, while Model 5 – for all three indices included simultaneously in 
the estimation. The comparison of the coefficients for the different democracy features indicates 
that social-liberal features have the strongest association with environmental efforts among 
developing countries, and that the social-liberal index is the only one significant. Moreover, the 
between-model with the social-liberal index as a predictor has the largest R2. When all three 
indices are included in one model (Model 5), the social-liberal index is also the only one that has 
a statistically significant coefficient, implying that democracies with strong traces of social-liberal 
features make greater environmental efforts than other democracies in the developing world. In 
the within-sample, the results are insignificant. 
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Table 5. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
and environmental efforts in developing countries 
 DV: Environmental efforts Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
            
Between part:       
Electoral democracy  0.687     
 (1.174)     
Thin liberal features  0.022   0.088 
  (0.230)   (0.208) 
Social-liberal features   0.390†  0.409* 
   (0.206)  (0.204) 
Deliberative features    0.054 0.055 
    (0.281) (0.273) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.481** 0.499** 0.415** 0.507** 0.396* 
 (0.161) (0.179) (0.142) (0.157) (0.167) 
Trade openness 0.424 0.368 0.174 0.388 0.149 
 (0.265) (0.251) (0.266) (0.242) (0.271) 
Time in the EU -1.810* -2.034** -1.548* -1.963** -1.436† 
 (0.715) (0.638) (0.680) (0.691) (0.762) 
Corruption 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.187*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.047) 
      
Within part:      
Electoral democracy  1.120     
 (0.849)     
Thin liberal features  0.092   0.095 
  (0.173)   (0.170) 
Social-liberal features   0.291  0.313 
   (0.359)  (0.374) 
Deliberative features    -0.043 -0.051 
    (0.153) (0.157) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.189 0.265 0.303 0.321 0.207 
 (0.682) (0.693) (0.683) (0.680) (0.705) 
Trade openness -0.157 -0.232 -0.214 -0.239 -0.230 
 (0.282) (0.273) (0.277) (0.267) (0.270) 
Time in the EU -0.984 -1.537† -1.471 -1.609† -1.597† 
 (0.878) (0.923) (0.915) (0.975) (0.966) 
Corruption -0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
Constant 3.325† 4.057*** 3.682*** 3.840* 3.215† 
 (1.752) (1.036) (1.063) (1.743) (1.817) 
      
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 
R2 between 0.705 0.700 0.714 0.699 0.714 
R2 within 0.086 0.080 0.083 0.081 0.084 
Number of countries 69 69 69 69 69 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of ‘environmental efforts’ in the developing world on different democracy features, 
with year fixed effects. The sample is limited to democracies as classified by Bjørnskov-Rode (2020). Both within- 
and between-parts of the equation include controls for the GDP per capita (natural log), trade openness, time in 
the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All 
independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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In order to compare the environmental commitments of democracies with thin liberal, social-
liberal, and deliberative features with those of authoritarian regimes, we performed the same sets 
of analyses for the full sample of countries, multiplying our indicators with a democracy dummy 
from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). The results are presented in Appendix D and they are similar 
to the results in the full sample. Democracies with thin liberal and social liberal features 
outperform authoritarian regimes in translating their climate laws into CO2 emission reductions 
to a stronger degree than the rest. Democracies with developed social-liberal features among 
OECD and BRIIC have higher environmental policy stringency than the rest, and the coefficient 
for deliberative democracy is no longer significant when the three democracy indicators are 
included in the same model. In the sample of developing countries, democracies with social-
liberal features also outperform authoritarian regimes in terms of environmental commitment to 
a stronger degree than democracies with other features. In the within-sample, however, the only 
significant result is for the electoral democracy index, which implies that developments in the 
level of democracy might be more important for strengthening environmental efforts in the 
developing world when compared to authoritarian regimes, than developments in any additional 
democracy features. The same conclusion can be made when comparing the R2 between the 
models – the model with the electoral democracy index as the independent variable explains 
more variance in environmental efforts than other models; more than the model with the social-
liberal democracy index.  
We also investigated whether arguments brought up in the green political theory literature apply 
to non-democracies, that is, whether thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative features play a 
role when we compare all countries regardless of their regime type. The results, presented in 
Appendix E, are similar to the ones described above and imply that liberal features in their thin 
understanding, social-liberal features and deliberation might also be important for establishing 
environmental commitments in non-democracies.  
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also used indicators of liberal, social-liberal 
(egalitarian) and deliberative features from the Varieties of Democracy institute as independent 
variables instead of our own indices. We found that our results in favour of social-liberal 
(egalitarian) democracy, and egalitarian features overall, among all regime types, are even 
stronger with the V-Dem measures (see Appendix F for results). Liberal democracies do not 
seem to do better than the rest, even though the indicators pertaining to rule of law are included 
in the coding.  
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Summary of the results  
In sum, the results indicate that democracies with developed social-liberal features outperform 
other democracies and authoritarian regimes in securing environmental commitments. The 
differences in the strength of association vary between the models. In the case of emission 
reductions, democracies with thin liberal features seem to be doing just as well as democracies 
with developed social-liberal features, and the explanatory power of the model with the social-
liberal index is only slightly higher than that of the model with the thin liberal  index. In the case 
of environmental policy stringency and environmental efforts, the differences between the effect 
size of thin liberal and social-liberal features are larger, yet still rather small. The weakest 
predictor of environmental commitments seems to be deliberative features, as its effect size is 
the smallest out of the three democracy types and is, for the most part, insignificant. Moreover, 
we even find a negative relationship between the deliberative democracy features and 
environmental policy stringency. We would also like to note that in the sample of developing 
countries, when the performance of democracy types is compared to that of authoritarian 
regimes, the level of democracy itself seems to be a more important predictor of stronger 
environmental efforts than the additional features of democracy.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of this study has been to investigate how countries that are (empirically) more or less 
associated with different democracy ideals perform in terms of their environmental 
commitments. Taking as a point of departure the theories on how the dominance of liberal 
values, in their thin interpretation, social-liberal traditions, and deliberative practices can 
influence the environmental commitments of states, we challenge fifty years of green political 
theoretical scholarship and put the established theoretical arguments to an empirical test.  
The results generally speak in favour of democracy with pronounced social-liberal features: 
democratic OECD-BRIIC countries with pronounced social-liberal features have significantly 
higher environmental policy stringency. In parallel, democracies with social-liberal features in the 
developing world also make greater environmental efforts than the rest. This implies that 
countries that carry out social-liberal politics, which results in higher equality among citizens in 
their access to public services such as healthcare and education, the prevalence of universalistic 
over means-tested policies, and higher spending on public rather than particularistic goods, tend 
to also adopt more stringent environmental policies, possibly as an example of such universalistic 
policies, compared to countries leaning towards any of the other ideals that we have examined. 
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Remarkably, this result is not driven by the exceptional social-liberal traditions of Northern 
Europe only, but is also true for countries in the developing world. 
The development of thin liberal features in democracies has as strong an association with CO2 
emission reductions following the adoption of climate laws and policies as the development  of 
social-liberal features. This might imply that market-based policy instruments, usually applied in 
democracies with strong markets, might be as effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions as 
taxes, usually used by democracies following a more social-liberal model. However, this insight 
needs further investigation before more definite conclusions can be drawn, especially given that 
policy instruments are now increasingly applied in policy packages rather than separately (Wicki, 
Huber, & Bernauer, 2020) and are being adopted in an increasing number of countries, not all of 
which could be characterized as social-liberal. 
Finally, deliberative features have the weakest association with environmental commitments 
among the three democracy features investigated in the paper. Our models even show that 
development in deliberation is associated with a decrease in environmental policy stringency 
among the OECD-BRIIC economies. This goes against the prediction of green political theories 
advocating deliberative democracy as a solution to environmental problems. Without knowing 
for certain, this might at least imply that as countries open up channels for deliberation, this also 
gives voice to anti-environmental interests, which might trump environmental interests, and 
provoke a decrease in the stringency of environmental policies. However, the negative result for 
deliberative democracy needs further exploration before we can draw this conclusion with any 
certainty. In addition, it could be that different types of democracy provide channels for 
facilitating different types of environmental policies. While thin liberal and social-liberal features 
are more suitable for emission mitigation policies, deliberation could be beneficial for policies 
related to adaptation to environmental problems (Ayers, 2011), which we do not investigate in 
this paper.  
Moreover, while there are empirical examples of countries with particularly pronounced social-
liberal features (Nordic countries) and thin liberal features (the United States and the United 
Kingdom), the examples of countries with pronounced deliberative practices, properly 
understood as deliberative democracies in political theory, are significantly harder to find. 
Therefore, it could be that the lack of effect from deliberation is driven by the fact that no 
country has so far reached a deliberative democratic ideal. Having said this, the results may still 
be of value. Although it might be an ideologically attractive idea to be inclusive and to involve 
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interest groups and the general public in decision-making processes, the expected environmental 
effectiveness of such operations should not be exaggerated.     
Our analyses also generate some implications for green political theory and the pronounced 
criticism of thin liberal democracy over the years. Our empirical analysis shows that democracies 
that develop the thin liberal features being so criticized in the literature, do not perform 
significantly worse than the others, and in fact they exhibit comparable results to those of social-
liberal democracies when it comes to, for example, reducing carbon emission intensity. This can 
be a result of the fact that thin liberal features often go together with some degree of rule of law 
and constraints on the executive, each of which are important for securing long-term 
environmental commitments.  
Finally, another limitation of the existing theories is that they, by only focusing on democracy 
features, overlook the importance of the factors that they discuss in reference to non-democratic 
regimes. However, their arguments are also relevant for understanding environmental 
commitments in non-democracies. In fact, our analysis shows that a more social-liberal politics is 
beneficial for countries’ environmental commitments regardless of the regime type. Future 
research should continue testing the relationship between the democratic ideals outlined in this 
article and various measures of environmental commitment as more data becomes available. 
Using process tracing approaches, future studies can also investigate − more qualitatively − how 
the hypothesized effect of thin liberal, deliberative, and social-liberal features have played out for 
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Appendix A. Data included in the construction of indices.  
1. Thin liberal features  
When choosing indicators, we were guided by the data availability and how precisely the 
indicators can capture countries’ liberal features in their thin conception. In terms of data 
availability, the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom of the World (Fraser Institute, 2020) had the 
most comprehensive dataset on individual and business freedom that was possible to get 
disaggregated data on. We opted for using as many indicators as possible that tap on individual 
and business freedom from the government regulation and deliberately excluded indicators 
related to regulatory quality, rule of law and ease of doing business, as they tap upon other 
features of political systems than thin liberal features. When constructing a latent variable 
through a factor analysis included the following indicators:  
1.1. Size of government index 
The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds to large general government consumption, 
large transfer sector, many government enterprises, and high marginal tax rates and low income 
thresholds, and 10 to small general government consumption, small transfer sector, few 
government enterprises, and low marginal tax rates and high income thresholds.  
The index consists of the following indicators:  
• General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption 
• Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
• Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of total investment 
• Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies).  
The index is panel-data adjusted.  
1.2. Protection of property rights.  
The indicator originates from the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic 
Forum and measures the extent to which “Property rights, including over financial assets, are 
defined and protected.” In the original indicator, if property rights are “poorly defined and 
protected by law”, a country gets a value of 1 and if property rights are “clearly defined and well 
protected by law”, a country gets a measure of 7. The variable from Fraser Institute varies from 
0 to 10 where 10 indicates a higher protection of property rights.  
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1.3. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts.  
The indicator originates from International Monetary Fund and taps on individual liberties. The 
Fraser Institute’s version of the indicator varies from 0 to 10, where a country scores 10 if 
ownership of foreign currency bank accounts is permitted without restrictions, and 0 if 
otherwise. 
1.4. Tariffs on foreign trade index 
The index captures the extent to which businesses face barriers when trading internationally. It 
consists of the following indicators:  
• Revenues from trade taxes, which originates from International Monetary Fund and is 
measured by the amount of tax on international trade as a shareof exports and imports. 
Countries with higher taxes on trade receive lower scores, while countries with no taxes 
on international trade receive 10.  
• Mean tariff rate, which originates from the World Trade Organizaiton. Countries that do 
not impose tariffs receive a score of 10. The higher the mean tariff rate, the lower the 
score.  
• Standard deviation of tariff rates, which comes from the World Trade Organization. 
Countries that impose uniform tariff rates are assigned a score of 10, while countries 
with higher standard deviation of tariff rates receive a lower score.  
1.5. Capital controls  
The indicator originates from the International Monetary Fund and measures the percentage of 
“capital controls not levied as a share of the total number of capital controls listed”, multiplied 
by 10. Higher values indicates lower amount of capital controls. Capital controls are government 
measures to restrict the flow of foreign capital in and out of the domestic economy, including 
taxes, tariffs, restriction on volumes, legislation, etc.  
1.6. Credit market regulations index  
The index measures to what extent government regulates the credit market. It consists of the 
following indicators:  
• Ownership of banks by the government that originates from Aginer et al (2019) and 
Barth, Capiro and Levine (2006). The variable reflects the percentage of bank deposits 
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held in privately owned banks, where higher values correspond to higher percentage of 
private banks. 
• Private sector credit originates from the World Development Indicators. The indicator 
measures “the extent of government borrowing relative to private sector borrowing.” 
Larger loans by the government imply more central planning and correspond to lower 
values in the indicator. Higher values correspond to higher share of credit to the private 
sector. 
• Interest rate controls originate from the World Development Indicators and measure the 
degree to which interest rates are determined by the market, whether monetary policy is 
stable and whether the real-deposit and lending rates are reasonable. Countries where 
interest rates are determined primarily by the market, when they are positive and when 
deposit and lending-rates are reasonable, they received a score of 10. Countries, where 
the deposit and lending rates are fixed by the government, while interest rates are 
negative, received a score of 0.  
2. Social-liberal features 
In the calculation of social-liberal features indices, we use selected individual questions from the 
V-Dem dataset, pertaining to egalitarian features. The description of the indicators are copied 
from the V-Dem Codebook (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, 
Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, 
Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2020). 
2.1. Equality in access to healthcare (v2pehealth)  
Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable 
them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens? 
Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as 
adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them 
unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed). 
Responses: 
0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to 
exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 
1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to 
exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 
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2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability 
to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 
3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality 
healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult 
citizens is undermined. 
4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot 
exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens. 
2.2. Equality in access to education (v2peedueq)  
Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable 
them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens? 
Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies 
slightly among countries. 
Responses: 
0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent 
(%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their 
basic rights as adult citizens. 
1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent 
(%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their 
basic rights as adult citizens. 
2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of 
children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic 
rights as adult citizens. 
3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of 
children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise 
their basic rights as adult citizens. 
4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive 




2.3. Means-tested v. universalistic policy (v2dlunivl)  
Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) 
members of the polity?  
Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged 
constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested. A universal (non-means tested) 
program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care 
schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these 
programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key 
point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this 
question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should 
be based on whatever programs exist.  
Responses:  
0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, 
unemployment, poverty programs).  
1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested. 
2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. 1⁄4 or 1/3) is 
universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population. 
3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic. 
4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., 1⁄4 or 1/3) are 
means-tested. 
5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-
tested.  
2.4. Particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps)  
Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national  
budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures?  
Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social 
group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork”, 
“clientelistic”, or “private goods.” Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities 
within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise 
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underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to 
receive the benefit. Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural 
spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not 
the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.  
Responses:  
0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic. 
1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. 1⁄4 
or 1/3) is public-goods. 
2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-
goods programs. 
3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., 1⁄4 
or 1/3) is particularistic.  
4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small 
portion is particularistic. 
3. Deliberative features  
In the calculation of deliberative features index, we use selected individual questions from the V-
Dem dataset, pertaining to deliberation and civil society participation. The description of the 
indicators are copied from the V-Dem Codebook (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, 
Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, 
Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2020). 
3.1. Engaged society, V-Dem (v2dlengage)  
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent 
are public deliberations?  
Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other 
public forums such as popular media.  
Responses:  
0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 
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1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost 
always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are 
typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, 
but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-
areas. 
4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups 
often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies 
among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots 
deliberation is common and unconstrained.  
3.2. Respect counterarguments (v2dlcountr) 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites 
acknowledge and respect counterarguments?  
Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the 
style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.  
Responses:  
0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.  
1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.  
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a 
negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.  
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive 
statements about them. 
4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they 
ultimately reject them for the most part.  
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently 
also even accept them and change their position.  
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3.3. CSO consultation (v2cscnsult) 
Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on 
policies relevant to their members? 
Responses:  
0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government 
may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at 
large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.  
1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into 
account.  
2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice 
on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through 
less formal arrangements.  
3.4. Range of consultation (v2dlconslt) 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of 
consultation at elite levels? 
Responses: 
0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative 
decisions on their own. 
1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites. 
2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such 
as the ruling party’s or parties’ local executives and/or women, youth and other branches. 
3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties. 
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives. 
5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically 
relevant sectors of society and business. 
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Appendix B. Correlation between the variables in different samples 
















Elect.dem. 1.00       
Thin liberal features 0.53 1.00      
Deliberative features 0.79 0.42 1.00     
Social-liberal features 0.62 0.52 0.51 1.00    
GDP per capita (ln) 0.64 0.63 0.51 0.81 1.00   
Trade openness (ln) 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.33 0.29 1.00  
Corruption -0.71 -0.55 -0.63 -0.80 -0.79 -0.23 1.00 
 
















Electoral democracy 1.00             
Thin liberal features 0.58 1.00      
Deliberative features 0.74 0.51 1.00     
Social-liberal features 0.65 0.72 0.50 1.00    
GDP per capita (ln) 0.65 0.87 0.58 0.81 1.00   
Trade openness (ln) 0.20 0.35 0.08 0.37 0.30 1.00  
Corruption -0.70 -0.72 -0.67 -0.74 -0.79 -0.24 1.00 
 

















Electoral democracy 1.00             
Thin liberal features 0.31 1.00      
Deliberative features 0.77 0.20 1.00     
Social-liberal features 0.31 0.43 0.25 1.00    
GDP per capita (ln) 0.25 0.51 0.08 0.68 1.00   
Trade openness (ln) 0.10 0.37 0.11 0.42 0.34 1.00  






Appendix C.  Country rankings for different cross-country samples 
Table C.1. Country rankings on thin liberal, deliberative and social-liberal democracy for 
the sample of OECD democracies 
N Thin Liberal democracy Social-liberal democracy Deliberative democracy 
1 Germany, West Norway Norway 
2 Netherlands Spain Germany, West 
3 United Kingdom Czech Republic Germany 
4 Denmark Japan Switzerland 
5 Switzerland Sweden Denmark 
6 Belgium Belgium Sweden 
7 Canada Switzerland Finland 
8 Ireland Denmark Italy 
9 United States France  Netherlands 
10 Italy Germany, West United States 
11 Sweden Greece Indonesia 
12 Finland Germany Austria 
13 France  Korea, South Belgium 
14 Germany Finland Australia 
15 Norway Austria Portugal 
16 Japan Slovenia Brazil 
17 Austria Canada Canada 
18 Australia Australia Korea, South 
19 Spain Italy India 
20 Portugal Netherlands Spain 
21 Czech Republic Portugal Slovenia 
22 Slovenia United Kingdom Japan 
23 Slovakia Ireland United Kingdom 
24 Greece Poland France  
25 Korea, South Hungary Greece 
26 Hungary Slovakia Czech Republic 
27 Indonesia Turkey Poland 
28 Turkey United States Ireland 
29 Poland Brazil Slovakia 
30 Brazil Indonesia Hungary 




Table C.2. Country rankings on thin liberal, deliberative and social-liberal democracy for 
the sample of democracies in the developing world 
N Thin liberal democracy Social-liberal democracy Deliberative democracy 
1 Panama Czech Republic Tunisia 
2 Guatemala Korea, South Mauritius 
3 Peru Estonia Costa Rica 
4 Armenia Lithuania Uruguay 
5 Georgia Slovenia Indonesia 
6 Romania Bhutan Mongolia 
7 Bulgaria Costa Rica Estonia 
8 Latvia Mauritius Ghana 
9 Estonia Poland Chile 
10 Uruguay Uruguay Brazil 
11 Chile Croatia Kenya 
12 Mauritius Latvia Korea, South 
13 Zambia Armenia Slovenia 
14 Nicaragua Malaysia  Niger 
15 Slovakia Georgia Benin 
16 Lithuania Slovakia Senegal 
17 Costa Rica Romania Lithuania 
18 El Salvador Bulgaria Thailand 
19 Mongolia Ukraine Bulgaria 
20 Paraguay North Macedonia Czech Republic 
21 Czech Republic Lesotho Jamaica 
22 Korea, South Hungary Philippines 
23 Liberia Botswana Bhutan 
24 Hungary Serbia Sierra Leone 
25 Albania Sri Lanka Panama 
26 Botswana Argentina India 
27 Slovenia Moldova Latvia 
28 Honduras Jamaica Botswana 
29 Dominican Republic Mongolia Mali 
30 Bolivia Panama Slovakia 
31 Kyrgyzstan Turkey Pakistan  
32 Croatia Albania Dominican Republic 
33 Nigeria Ecuador Peru 
34 Kenya Kyrgyzstan Poland 
35 Jamaica Thailand Malawi 
36 Papua New Guinea Tunisia Mauritania 
37 Poland Ghana Colombia 
38 Philippines Senegal Nepal 
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N Thin liberal democracy Social-liberal democracy Deliberative democracy 
39 Indonesia Chile Mexico 
40 North Macedonia Benin Bolivia 
41 Turkey Colombia Nigeria 
42 Ghana Brazil Georgia 
43 Brazil Kenya Serbia 
44 Moldova Nicaragua Honduras 
45 Ecuador Venezuela Argentina 
46 Madagascar Burundi Ukraine 
47 Mexico Indonesia Croatia 
48 Serbia Mali Lesotho 
49 Colombia Sierra Leone Liberia 
50 Malaysia  Bolivia Kyrgyzstan 
51 Lesotho Peru Zambia 
52 Mauritania Niger Paraguay 
53 Guinea Nepal Romania 
54 Argentina Mexico Moldova 
55 Thailand India Malaysia  
56 Sierra Leone Philippines El Salvador 
57 Malawi Zambia Turkey 
58 Ukraine Mauritania Guatemala 
59 Bhutan Malawi Ecuador 
60 Mali Dominican Republic Albania 
61 Senegal Nigeria Hungary 
62 Bangladesh Liberia Guinea 
63 Tunisia Guatemala Madagascar 
64 Sri Lanka El Salvador Nicaragua 
65 Venezuela Guinea Papua New Guinea 
66 Pakistan  Paraguay Armenia 
67 Benin Bangladesh Burundi 
68 Burundi Papua New Guinea Sri Lanka 
69 Nepal Honduras North Macedonia 
70 India Madagascar Venezuela 




Appendix D.  Comparing democracies with thin liberal, social-liberal, 
and deliberative features with authoritarian regimes  
In this additional analysis, we create the indices of thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative 
democracy to compare their environmental commitment to those in authoritarian regimes.  To 
create indices of democracy with the respective features, we multiply the thin-liberal, social-liberal, 
and deliberative indices with a democracy dummy taken from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020), which 
is an extended version of the dichotomous measure of democracy from Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland (2010). We do not multiply the measure of the three features with the continuous 
electoral democracy index to reduce the variation brought by the variation in the level of 
electoral democracy, leaving only the variation in the three features between democracies and 
authoritarian regimes that are coded as 0. Figure D.1. presents the logic of our 
operationalization, while Figure D.1. presents the results.  
Table D.1. Strategy for operationalization of different democratic traditions  
Political system Operationalization 
Electoral democracy (model 1) Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy)  
Thin liberal democracy (model 2) Dichotomous Democracy Index *  
Thin Liberal Features Factor 
(Size of government; 
Protection of property rights; 
Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts; 
Tariffs on foreign trade; 
Capital controls; 
Credit market regulations) 
Social-liberal democracy (model 3) Dichotomous Democracy Index *  
Socio-Liberal Features Factor 
(Health equality; 
Educational equality;  
Spending for public goods; 
Universalistic character of policies) 
Deliberative democracy (model 4) Dichotomous Democracy Index *  
Deliberative Features Factor 
(Extent of public deliberations; 
Officials’ respect for counterarguments; 
Extent of civil society consultation 
Range of consultations) 
Reference: Authoritarian system Dichotomous Democracy Index = 0 
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Table D.2. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
of democracies and the effectiveness of climate laws 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DV: ln(CO2/GDP)     
          
Electoral democracy 0.008    
 (0.106)    
Stock of laws*Electoral democracy -0.031†    
 (0.016)    
Thin liberal democracy   0.003   
  (0.011)   
Stock of laws*Thin liberal democracy  -0.005*   
  (0.002)   
Social-liberal democracy    0.017  
   (0.014)  
Stock of laws*Social-liberal democracy   -0.005*  
   (0.002)  
Deliberative democracy     0.006 
    (0.011) 
Stock of laws*Deliberative democracy    -0.004† 
    (0.002) 
Stock of mitigation laws  0.014 0.008 0.008 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant -8.908* -8.799* -8.677* -9.056* 
 (3.615) (3.603) (3.622) (3.576) 
     
Observations 2,074 2,074 2,074 2,074 
R2 0.314 0.315 0.317 0.313 
Number of countries 126 126 126 126 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
OLS regression of a natural logarithm of CO2 emissions per 2011 PPP $1 GDP on the interaction 
effect between the stock of recent mitigation laws and different democracy features, with country and 
year fixed effects. The regressions control for the GDP HP filter, squared term of GDP per capita 
(natural log), the size of imports and services as a percentage of GDP, difference between the yearly 
average temperature and the long term (1980-2015) average temperature and federalism. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables 






Figure D.1.  Marginal effects of the stock of recent climate change mitigation laws on 
CO2 emissions conditional on the level of electoral democracy (1), extent of thin liberal 
democracy features (2), social-liberal democracy features (3), and deliberative democracy 
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Table D.2. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
of democracies and environmental policy stringency in OECD and BRIICS. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV: EPS      
            
Between part:       
Electoral democracy  0.170     
 (0.425)     
Thin liberal democracy  0.118†   -0.099 
  (0.061)   (0.137) 
Social-liberal democracy   0.157**  0.274** 
   (0.054)  (0.094) 
Deliberative democracy    0.095 -0.049 
    (0.066) (0.111) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Trade openness 1.640 1.335 0.896 1.328 0.081 
 (2.550) (2.442) (2.346) (2.361) (2.258) 
Time in the EU 0.006† 0.005 0.006† 0.006† 0.006† 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -1.660*** -1.378*** -1.142** -1.498*** -1.099*** 
 (0.428) (0.350) (0.373) (0.372) (0.332) 
      
Within part:      
Electoral democracy  -0.827     
 (0.673)     
Thin liberal democracy  -0.119   0.054 
  (0.109)   (0.135) 
Social-liberal democracy   -0.229  0.415 
   (0.149)  (0.295) 
Deliberative democracy    -0.302** -0.545** 
    (0.105) (0.198) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.037* 0.038* 0.040* 0.032* 0.031† 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Trade openness 2.188 3.306 1.758 0.276 -0.085 
 (5.370) (5.192) (5.334) (5.501) (5.253) 
Time in the EU 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Corruption -1.656 -1.437 -1.764 -3.098** -3.135** 
 (1.417) (1.447) (1.454) (1.190) (1.077) 
Constant 1.018* 0.773** 0.596* 0.802** 0.613* 
 (0.422) (0.236) (0.279) (0.274) (0.239) 
      
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 
R2 between 0.695 0.714 0.738 0.708 0.746 
R2 within 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.791 0.796 
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of environmental policy stringency on different democracy features with year fixed 
effects in the OECD and BRIICS. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for the GDP 
per capita (natural log), trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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Table D.3. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
of democracies and environmental efforts in developing countries. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV: Environmental efforts      
            
Between part:       
Electoral democracy  2.449***     
 (0.407)     
Thin liberal democracy  0.267***   0.063 
  (0.058)   (0.149) 
Social-liberal democracy   0.339***  0.384** 
   (0.068)  (0.142) 
Deliberative democracy    0.264*** -0.106 
    (0.060) (0.174) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.295** 0.231* 0.235* 0.263** 0.222* 
 (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) (0.098) (0.101) 
Trade openness 0.494*** 0.461*** 0.460*** 0.488*** 0.448*** 
 (0.117) (0.126) (0.129) (0.122) (0.135) 
Time in the EU -1.955*** -2.561*** -2.295*** -2.384*** -2.341*** 
 (0.472) (0.458) (0.462) (0.459) (0.497) 
Corruption 0.170*** 0.195*** 0.166*** 0.211*** 0.158*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) 
      
Within part:      
Electoral democracy  0.999†     
 (0.592)     
Thin liberal democracy  0.004   0.056 
  (0.080)   (0.180) 
Social-liberal democracy   -0.014  -0.148 
   (0.071)  (0.245) 
Deliberative democracy    0.008 0.065 
    (0.077) (0.158) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.626 0.668 0.674 0.673 0.670 
 (0.452) (0.450) (0.451) (0.452) (0.451) 
Trade openness 0.146 0.159 0.158 0.160 0.157 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
Time in the EU -1.161† -1.689* -1.725* -1.668* -1.681* 
 (0.697) (0.706) (0.710) (0.767) (0.760) 
Corruption -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
Constant 2.311** 3.636*** 3.429*** 3.372*** 3.523*** 
 (0.715) (0.648) (0.658) (0.663) (0.706) 
      
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 
R2 between 0.719 0.708 0.720 0.706 0.721 
R2 within 0.076 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.070 
Number of countries 115 115 115 115 115 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of ‘environmental efforts’ in the developing world on different democracy features, 
with year fixed effects. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for the GDP per capita 
(natural log), trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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Appendix E. Comparing the effects of thin liberal, social liberal, and 
deliberative features without distinguishing between the regime types 
In this section we perform the same set of regressions as in the main analysis, but for the full 
sample of countries without distinguishing them into regime type. Thereby, we investigate 
whether the prevalence of thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features plays a role in 
environmental commitment of countries. In all models we additionally control for the level of 
electoral democracy, as it might influence both our independent and dependent variables.  
Table E.1. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal, and deliberative features 
and effectiveness of climate laws 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DV: ln(CO2/GDP)     
          
Stock of laws*Elect.dem. -0.031†    
 (0.016)    
Thin liberal features  -0.017   
  (0.026)   
Stock of laws*Thin liberal  -0.011*   
  (0.005)   
Social-liberal features   0.081  
   (0.063)  
Stock of laws*Social-liberal   -0.009*  
   (0.004)  
Deliberative features    -0.016 
    (0.026) 
Stock of laws*Deliberative    -0.001 
    (0.005) 
Stock of mitigation laws  0.014 0.030† 0.022† -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) 
Electoral democracy 0.008 -0.007 -0.029 0.026 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.124) 
Constant -8.908* -9.464** -8.670* -9.491** 
 (3.615) (3.471) (3.562) (3.503) 
     
Observations 2,074 2,074 2,074 2,074 
R2 0.314 0.316 0.318 0.311 
Number of countries 126 126 126 126 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
OLS regression of a natural logarithm of CO2 emissions per 2011 PPP $1 GDP on the interaction effect between the 
recent stock of laws and different country features, with country and year fixed effects. The regressions control for 
the level of electoral democracy, the GDP HP filter, squared term of GDP per capita (natural log), the size of imports 
and services as a percentage of GDP, difference between the yearly average temperature and the long term (1980-
2015) average temperature and federalism. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 
† p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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Figure E.1.  Marginal effects of the stock of recent climate change mitigation laws on 
CO2 emissions conditional on the level of electoral democracy (1), extent of thin liberal  
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Table E.2. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative features 
and environmental policy stringency in OECD 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV: EPS      
            
Between part:       
Thin liberal features  0.245†   0.162 
  (0.137)   (0.141) 
Social-liberal features   0.349***  0.366*** 
   (0.080)  (0.078) 
Deliberative features    0.160 0.344† 
    (0.218) (0.176) 
Electoral democracy  0.170 0.061 -0.224 -0.087 -0.867† 
 (0.425) (0.417) (0.347) (0.583) (0.504) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade openness 1.640 1.119 0.528 1.639 0.635 
 (2.550) (2.502) (2.278) (2.154) (1.878) 
Time in the EU 0.006† 0.005 0.005 0.006† 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -1.660*** -1.523*** -1.307*** -1.619*** -1.162*** 
 (0.428) (0.345) (0.340) (0.421) (0.273) 
      
Within part:      
Thin liberal features  -0.120   -0.100 
  (0.168)   (0.163) 
Social-liberal features   0.083  -0.047 
   (0.228)  (0.223) 
Deliberative features    -0.461† -0.463† 
    (0.259) (0.256) 
Electoral democracy  -0.827 -0.930 -0.919 0.367 0.321 
 (0.673) (0.632) (0.786) (1.051) (1.062) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.037* 0.033* 0.037* 0.032* 0.029† 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Trade openness 2.188 3.122 2.192 1.126 1.791 
 (5.370) (5.372) (5.455) (5.315) (5.355) 
Time in the EU 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Corruption -1.656 -1.833 -1.701 -3.090* -3.307* 
 (1.417) (1.416) (1.372) (1.325) (1.289) 
Constant 1.018* 0.275 0.121 0.618 -1.240† 
 (0.422) (0.417) (0.328) (0.596) (0.704) 
      
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 
R2 between 0.695 0.708 0.768 0.699 0.785 
R2 within 0.780 0.782 0.781 0.790 0.791 
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of environmental policy stringency on different country features with year fixed effects in 
the OECD and BRIICS. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for the level of electoral 
democracy, GDP per capita (natural log), trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
 
 55 
Table E.3. The relationship between thin liberal, social-liberal and deliberative features 
and environmental efforts in developing countries 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV: Environmental efforts      
            
Between part:       
Thin liberal features  0.133   0.129 
  (0.171)   (0.158) 
Social-liberal features   0.323†  0.339* 
   (0.168)  (0.163) 
Deliberative features    -0.150 -0.195 
    (0.240) (0.244) 
Electoral democracy  2.449*** 2.350*** 2.495*** 2.853*** 2.925*** 
 (0.407) (0.454) (0.397) (0.772) (0.828) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.295** 0.267* 0.209* 0.282** 0.163 
 (0.095) (0.106) (0.104) (0.101) (0.119) 
Trade openness 0.494*** 0.451*** 0.406** 0.505*** 0.375** 
 (0.117) (0.133) (0.128) (0.119) (0.142) 
Time in the EU 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.142** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) 
Corruption -1.955*** -1.966*** -1.544** -2.031*** -1.634*** 
 (0.472) (0.474) (0.473) (0.496) (0.494) 
      
Within part:      
Thin liberal features  0.116   0.103 
  (0.162)   (0.161) 
Social-liberal features   0.325  0.365 
   (0.277)  (0.298) 
Deliberative features    -0.084 -0.120 
    (0.133) (0.138) 
Electoral democracy  0.999† 0.978† 0.995† 1.179† 1.230† 
 (0.592) (0.590) (0.585) (0.697) (0.690) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.626 0.569 0.588 0.622 0.529 
 (0.452) (0.461) (0.452) (0.452) (0.460) 
Trade openness 0.146 0.138 0.152 0.152 0.154 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.098) (0.105) (0.103) 
Time in the EU -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Corruption -1.161† -1.151† -1.044 -1.343† -1.279† 
 (0.697) (0.697) (0.678) (0.740) (0.706) 
Constant 2.311** 2.153** 1.616* 2.576** 1.772* 
 (0.715) (0.687) (0.739) (0.864) (0.875) 
      
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 
R2 between 0.719 0.721 0.730 0.720 0.733 
R2 within 0.076 0.077 0.080 0.077 0.082 
Number of countries 115 115 115 115 115 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of ‘environmental efforts’ in the developing world on different country features, with year 
fixed effects. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for the level of electoral democracy, 
GDP per capita (natural log), trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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Appendix F. Analysis with democracy features as operationalized by 
the Varieties of Democracy project  
We also run our analysis with democracy features as operationalized by the Varieties of 
Democracy project (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, 
Glynn, Hicken, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, 
Staton, Cornell, et al., 2020). The liberal component index contains indicators related to equality 
before law and individual liberties, including freedom of domestic movement, freedom from 
political killings, etc., judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the 
executive. This operationalization of liberal features differs from the issues brought up in green 
political theory, but we are, nevertheless, interested in whether the features pertaining to the 
‘thick’ understanding of liberal democracy correlate with environmental commitments as 
opposed to the ‘thin’ understanding tested in the main analysis. The egalitarian component index 
includes an index measuring equality in respect to the protection of civil liberties, an index 
measuring equality in access to power, and an index measuring equality in distribution of 
resources, which is the basis for our index of social-liberal features. The deliberative component index 
consists of indicators pertaining to reasoned justification, justifications in terms of a common 
good, respect of counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society. Our indictor of 
deliberative democracy includes the last three of the aforementioned indicators, and ‘civil society 
consultations’.  
The correlations between the V-Dem indicators and the indices used in our main analysis are 
presented in Table F.1. The table shows that our index of deliberative features has the highest 
correlation with the V-Dem’s deliberative component (0.97). Our social-liberal features index 
and V-Dem’s egalitarian component correlate at 0.89, which is also very high. Thin liberal and V-
Dem’s liberal component have the lowest correlation coefficient (0.54), as expected, as they 
measure different phenomena. Despite the relatively high correlation between the social-liberal 
and deliberative features indices and the egalitarian and deliberative components from V-Dem 
respectively, our indices still correlate at a much lower degree than the V-Dem indicators, which 




Table F.1. Correlation between V-Dem indicators and our indices measuring thin liberal, 












Thin Liberal 1.00           
Social Liberal 0.55 1.00         
Deliberative 0.52 0.58 1.00       
Liberal (V-Dem) 0.54 0.68 0.87 1.00     
Egalitarian (V-Dem) 0.49 0.89 0.72 0.81 1.00   





Table F.2. The relationship between liberal, egalitarian, and deliberative features (from 
V-Dem) and effectiveness of climate laws 
  Sample of democracies Full sample 
DV: ln(CO2/GDP) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
              
Liberal features  0.037   0.086   
 (0.122)   (0.150)   
Stock of laws*Liberal -0.027   -0.030†   
 (0.020)   (0.017)   
Egalitarian features  0.244   -0.024  
  (0.202)   (0.201)  
Stock of laws*Egalitarian  -0.034*   -0.049*  
  (0.014)   (0.020)  
Deliberative features   -0.005   0.013 
   (0.094)   (0.082) 
Stock of laws*Deliberative   0.020   -0.003 
   (0.027)   (0.019) 
Stock of mitigation laws  0.016 0.021† -0.023 0.015 0.029† -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 
Electoral democracy     -0.060 -0.013 -0.023 
    (0.169) (0.112) (0.119) 
Constant -11.431*** -11.283*** -12.014*** -9.056* -8.811* -9.535** 
 (3.350) (3.289) (3.257) (3.587) (3.567) (3.501) 
       
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 2,074 2,074 2,074 
R2 0.476 0.479 0.475 0.313 0.316 0.311 
Number of countries 94 94 94 126 126 126 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
OLS regression of a natural logarithm of CO2 emissions per 2011 PPP $1 GDP on the interaction effect between the stock of 
recent mitigation laws and different country features (as operationalized by V-Dem), with country and year fixed effects. 
Models 1-3 are for the sample of democracies as categorized by Bjørnskov-Rode (2020). Models 4-6 are for the full sample of 
countries. All regressions control for the level of democracy, the GDP HP filter, squared term of GDP per capita (natural 
log), the size of imports and services as a percentage of GDP, difference between the yearly average temperature and the long 
term (1980-2015) average temperature, and federalism. Models 4-6 also include a control for the level of electoral democracy. 





Figure F.1. Marginal effects of the stock of recent climate change mitigation laws on CO2 
emissions conditional on the extent of liberal features (1), egalitarian features (2), and 
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Figure F.2. Marginal effects of the stock of recent climate change mitigation laws on 
CO2 emissions conditional on the extent of liberal features (4), egalitarian features (5), 
and deliberative features (6) in the world countries, with 95% confidence intervals, 
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Table F.2. The relationship between thin liberal, egalitarian, and deliberative features 
(from V-Dem) and environmental policy stringency in OECD and BRIICS 
 Sample of democracies Full sample 
DV: EPS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Between         
Liberal features -0.204   -3.098* -1.441   0.769 
 (1.841)   (1.577) (3.189)   (2.449) 
Egalitarian features  2.681***  4.097***  3.056***  3.159*** 
  (0.735)  (0.891)  (0.687)  (0.834) 
Deliberative features   0.564 -0.396   -0.153 -0.041 
   (1.200) (1.076)   (1.226) (0.981) 
Electoral democracy     1.401 -1.143** 0.220 -1.872 
     (3.030) (0.436) (0.602) (2.354) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trade openness 0.793 -0.465 1.024 -1.491 1.693 -0.083 1.239 -0.513 
 (2.619) (2.182) (2.055) (2.304) (2.659) (2.207) (2.315) (2.443) 
Time in the EU 0.006† 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006† 0.004 0.006† 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Corruption -1.667† -0.834* -1.540*** -1.253** -1.821*** -1.174*** -1.629*** -1.044* 
 (0.978) (0.335) (0.397) (0.479) (0.460) (0.306) (0.426) (0.433) 
         
Within         
Liberal features -3.144**   -2.201† -2.218   -1.016 
 (1.212)   (1.145) (1.738)   (1.673) 
Egalitarian features  -1.498  0.304  -1.312  -1.582 
  (1.600)  (1.523)  (1.044)  (1.026) 
Deliberative features   -2.333* -1.514   -1.567† -1.371† 
   (1.085) (1.126)   (0.921) (0.810) 
Electoral democracy     1.078 -0.041 0.170 1.870 
     (1.507) (1.158) (0.867) (1.582) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.019 0.028† 0.022 0.018 0.034* 0.038* 0.033* 0.033* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Trade openness -1.211 0.588 -1.331 -2.007 1.699 2.118 1.315 1.113 
 (5.440) (5.078) (5.080) (5.356) (5.571) (5.223) (5.359) (5.203) 
Time in the EU 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Corruption -3.112** -2.124† -3.648** -3.924*** -2.275† -1.646 -2.847* -2.950* 
 (1.113) (1.200) (1.126) (1.181) (1.375) (1.517) (1.316) (1.356) 
Constant 1.091 -1.167† 0.549 0.752 1.221* -0.255 1.090 -0.437 
 (1.744) (0.612) (1.066) (0.918) (0.528) (0.351) (0.827) (0.808) 
         
Observations 672 672 672 672 753 753 753 753 
R2 between 0.816 0.709 0.614 0.737 0.697 0.786 0.696 0.793 
R2 within 0.596 0.807 0.816 0.819 0.786 0.783 0.787 0.792 
Number of countreis 31 31 31 31 34 34 34 34 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of environmental policy stringency in the OECD and BRIICS on different country features (as 
operationalized by V-Dem), with year fixed effects. Models 1-4 are for the sample of democracies as categorized by Bjørnskov-Rode 
(2020). Models 5-8 are for the full sample of countries. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for GDP per 
capita (natural log), trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. In Models 5-8 both within- and between-parts also include a 
control for the level of electoral democracy. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All 
independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
 62 
Table F.3. The relationship between thin liberal, egalitarian, and deliberative features 
(from V-Dem) and environmental efforts in developing countries 
  Sample of democracies Full sample 
DV: Envir. efforts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Between         
Liberal features 0.735   1.082 0.463   0.846 
 (1.013)   (1.146) (0.977)   (0.956) 
Egalitarian features  0.629  0.451  1.269†  1.336† 
  (0.964)  (1.068)  (0.678)  (0.682) 
Deliberative features   0.085 -0.671   -0.546 -1.183 
   (1.082) (1.128)   (0.813) (0.848) 
Electoral democracy     2.078* 2.028*** 2.857*** 2.220* 
     (0.910) (0.462) (0.733) (0.980) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.488** 0.487*** 0.497** 0.472** 0.299** 0.292** 0.284** 0.277** 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.152) (0.152) (0.099) (0.097) (0.099) (0.101) 
Trade openness 0.476† 0.413† 0.452† 0.456† 0.482*** 0.441*** 0.509*** 0.452*** 
 (0.243) (0.246) (0.236) (0.264) (0.117) (0.120) (0.119) (0.125) 
Time in the EU 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.191*** 0.171** 0.173*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.140** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) 
Corruption -1.655* -1.768* -1.954** -1.578* -1.846*** -1.588** -2.053*** -1.580** 
 (0.684) (0.824) (0.707) (0.804) (0.534) (0.511) (0.503) (0.544) 
         
Within         
Liberal features -0.048   -0.134 -1.193†   -1.235† 
 (0.745)   (0.746) (0.681)   (0.652) 
Egalitarian features  1.635†  1.771†  0.926  1.374 
  (0.900)  (0.909)  (0.909)  (0.936) 
Deliberative features   -0.153 -0.225   -0.442 -0.360 
   (0.489) (0.504)   (0.450) (0.420) 
Electoral democracy     1.650* 0.919 1.264† 1.768* 
     (0.737) (0.589) (0.708) (0.791) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.113 0.066 0.107 0.081 0.589 0.617 0.627 0.583 
 (0.663) (0.654) (0.656) (0.652) (0.447) (0.452) (0.450) (0.445) 
Trade openness -0.277 -0.225 -0.276 -0.242 0.143 0.150 0.158 0.159 
 (0.277) (0.278) (0.271) (0.283) (0.105) (0.099) (0.106) (0.107) 
Time in the EU -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Corruption -1.276 -1.029 -1.333 -1.242 -1.618* -1.021 -1.413† -1.633* 
 (1.018) (0.967) (1.033) (1.064) (0.759) (0.729) (0.756) (0.806) 
Constant 2.948† 3.381** 3.649* 2.986† 2.201** 1.794* 2.478** 1.905* 
 (1.604) (1.226) (1.594) (1.785) (0.758) (0.744) (0.791) (0.813) 
         
Observations 420 420 420 420 718 718 718 718 
R2 between 0.697 0.695 0.695 0.698 0.720 0.729 0.720 0.734 
R2 within 0.073 0.083 0.079 0.085 0.083 0.078 0.079 0.089 
Number of countries 70 70 70 70 115 115 115 115 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Within-between regression of ‘environmental efforts’ in the developing world on different country features (as operationalized by V-
Dem), with year fixed effects. Models 1-4 are for the sample of democracies as categorized by Bjørnskov-Rode (2020). Models 5-8 are 
for the full sample of countries. Both within- and between-parts of the equation include controls for GDP per capita (natural log), 
trade openness, time in the EU, and corruption. Models 5-8 also include a control for the level of electoral democracy. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
 
